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Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature​[1]​
 
This paper investigates what Newton could have meant in a now famous passage from De Gravitatione (hereafter “DeGrav”) that “space is as it were an emanative effect of God” (21). First I offer a careful examination of the four key passages within DeGrav that bear on this. I argue that the logic of Newton’s argument permits several interpretations (section I). Second I sketch four options: i) one approach associated with the Cambridge Platonist, Thomas More, recently investigated by Dana Jalobeanu and Ed Slowik; ii) one traditional neo-Platonic approach; iii) a necessitarian approach associated with Howard Stein’s interpretation, recently reaffirmed by Andrew Janiak; iv) an approach connected with Bacon’s efforts to reformulate a useful notion of form and laws of nature. Hitherto only the first and third options have received scholarly attention. I offer arguments to treat Newtonian emanation as a species of Baconian formal causation and in this way to combine some of the most attractive elements of the first three options (section II). Finally in Section III, I suggest that the recent scholarly focus on emanation has obscured the importance of Newton’s very interesting claims about existence and measurement in the same passage(s). 

I: Four passages from DeGrav
In this section, I introduce and analyze four passages from De Grav. 
The first passage, A, reads: “[N]ow it may be expected that I should define extension [space--ES] as substance, accident, or else nothing at all. But by no means, for it has its own manner of existing which is proper to it and fits neither substances nor accidents. It is not substance: on the one hand, because it is not absolute in itself, but it is as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being; on the other hand, because it is not among the proper affections that denote substance, namely actions, such as thoughts in the mind and motions in body,” (DeGrav, 21).
The second one, B, reads: “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (DeGrav, 26).
In these two passages Newton claims that space is eternal in duration and immutable. This much appears clear, although my use of ‘is’ might not do full justice to the claim that it has its “own manner” of existence. (I return to this in the second and third section.) Space is an emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being.  It is tempting to identify the eternal and immutable being with God, but Newton’s use of “as it were” in passage A should give us pause. What is the eternal and immutable emanative cause of space? In this section I offer some preliminary answers. We shall also come to understand what it might mean to say that “space is an affection of everything.”
The plot thickens with two other passages.
The third passage, C, reads: “Space is an affection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can exists which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited” (DeGrav, 25; emphasis added).
The fourth passage, D, reads: “[l]est anyone should…imagine God to be like body, extended and made of divisible parts, it should be known that spaces themselves are not actually divisible and furthermore, that any being has a manner proper to itself of being present in spaces” (De Grav, 26).
That space is an affection of everything is clarified by these two passages: it means that all existing entities are located in some spatial structure (Stein, 2002). A more Kantian way of saying this is that space is (part of) the condition of possibility for any entity. (If one were to parody philosophy-speak one might say this as follows: spatiality is a quality that belongs to everything.) 
Moreover, because of passage C we can specify something more explicit about the eternal emanative cause of space; it is the first existing being. Most readers would be inclined to call the first existing, eternal, and immutable being, “God.” But this is too easy because it leaves unexplained Newton’s use of “as it were.” Of course, we are also still left clarifying what it means that space is an emanative effect of the first existing eternal and immutable being. 
One way to approach Newton use of “as it were” is to interpret it as his attempt to indicate that he is discussing a philosophical God, one that has no anthropomorphic qualities. Emanation as a form of divine causation is traditionally distinguished from conceptions that refer to God’s will.​[2]​ I will extend this suggestion in section II. But for now, I leave that aside. Newton is clearly signaling that his God does not stand outside nature; even God exists spatially. In DeGrav, Newton clearly rejects a soul of the world with God standing outside nature (30; Slowik 2008; see also Newton 2004, 124-5). This fits nicely with Newton’s view later in life in his “Account of the Commercium Epistolicum,” where Newton rejects Leibniz’s view of God as “an intelligence above the bounds of the world; whence it seems to follow that he cannot do anything within the bounds of the world, unless by an incredible miracle” (Newton 2004, 125). In context Newton has just affirmed that while God is not the soul of the world, he is omnipresent so this accords with the view of DeGrav (recall: “no being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way” 25). If Leibniz’s God is above the bounds of the world, this means he is outside of space and time altogether. God would literally be acting from nowhere, that is, an incredible miracle. Thus, in his response to Leibniz, Newton is echoing the doctrine of the sixth chapter of Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise; in a discussion of miracles, Spinoza rejects the very intelligibility of placing God above the bounds of the world (a view also associated with Boyle). 
Nevertheless, before we start casting our net among contextual uses of “emanation” (section II), we have not exhausted all the reasonable options in trying to establish the identity of the emanative cause of space based on Newton’s text alone. It is probably safe to assume that for Newton ordinary material entities and (maybe less likely) ordinary minds (which are more “noble” than bodies, see DeGrav, 20; Slowik 2008) are not eternal and immutable, and can, thus, be ruled out as the first existing beings. But despite the recent philosophic interest in DeGrav, it has not yet received comment that Newton’s wording in these four passages is compatible with the position that space is the first existing being. The emanative cause of space could be space itself! Newton’s space would then be a Godlike causa sui. This is not as crazy as it sounds: Newton is certain that space is eternal, immutable, immobile, indivisible, and infinite (viz. “space is extended infinitely in all directions” 23); it is the condition of possibility of all beings. So, given these claims why not call space, a philosophic conception of God? This could then explain Newton’s “as it were.” Before one rejects this, shall we say, Spinozistic reading out of hand, one should recognize that Newton is aware of the option because he writes, “I see what Descartes feared, namely if he should consider space infinite, it would perhaps become God” (25; see also the treatment Descartes and the atheists at 31-2). 
Yet, it would appear unlikely that Newton would endorse this reading because he insists that it is “repugnant to reason” that God created “his own ubiquity” (26). Presumably this rules out any causa sui. Unfortunately, this conclusion cannot be established definitely because emanation is a doctrine that avoids creation in time. All we can say is that is that the first emanative cause and its effect are both eternal, but this is, I think, compatible with causa sui.
In the next section, I’ll try to advance the debate by canvassing four usages of “emanation” available in the seventeenth century. 

II: Four kinds of Emanation 
There can be no doubt that according to Newton space is an emanative effect of something (eternal, immutable, etc). I am familiar with four possible meanings of the word ‘emanation’ in the seventeenth century. Let me survey these and comment on the plausibility that Newton might have had any one of them in mind.
First, there is the definition of emanation by the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, who was well known to Newton. Even by contemporaries Newton was taken to be following More in various ways. For example, in his “Account of the Commercium Epistolicum,” Newton notes that the editors of Acta Eruditorum point to More’s potential influence on Newton (Newton, 2004, 124-5). For More an emanative is cause is an immediate cause which is co-present with its effect. As More writes, “a Cause as merely by being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect,” (quoted in Jalobeanu, 2007).​[3]​ No doubt some of Newton’s comments can be slotted into this definition. This notion of causation must have been very influential because as late as the 1730s it is still Hume’s target in his eight rule of reasoning (without mention of More): “an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward its influences and operation. For as like effects necessarily follow from like causes, and in a contiguous time and place, their separation for a moment shews, that these causes are not compleat ones” (Treatise, 1.3.15).​[4]​ 
Nevertheless, while there are ways in which Newton’s approach harmonizes with Cambridge Platonism (see Slowik 2008; cf. Stein 2002, 269), More’s particular definition of emanation is uninformative as an aid to understanding the details of Newton’s claims (in A-D). It is at best consistent with these passages, but even Slowik’s splendid paper does not help account for all the rich details in them. It is, thus, a bit surprising that so much scholarly attention is focused on mining the More-Newton connection. This is not to deny the Platonist roots of Newton’s approach.
Second there is what I call a traditional neo-Platonic version of emanation: it relates a pure or perfect cause with an impure or imperfect imitation of it. The perfect cause emanates a property to the imperfect effect so that the effect “participates in” or has an inferior version of the property or accident (for an informative account, see Mercer, 189-190). Something like this concept is clearly presupposed in passage B. For in it immutability and eternality are transferred from the cause to the effect. This is characteristic of neo-Platonic emanation. It is a bit unfortunate that Newton does not explain the causal transference of immobility, indivisibility, and infinitude from God to space in a similar matter. Newton’s silence frustrates our search. If Newton had fully intended this use of “emanation” it is a bit surprising that in passage D he does not mention God as the source of space’s immobility, indivisibility, and infinitude; this would have been a natural place for him to do so in clarifying the relationship between the emanative cause and effect. (In section 4.2, Slowik uses these details to claim that Newton is arguing from space to God.)
Nevertheless, we should not entirely forego this option because it fits with two other aspects of Newton’s view: i) while space is “uncreated” (33), it is somehow not quite absolute (recall passage A). In fact, Newton’s locution about the emanative cause, “as it were God,” could indicate that it is more “absolute” than space. Related to this is ii) that Newton does seem committed to things having different degrees of reality (see also Slowik 2008). This is partly indicated by his claim that things having their “own manner of existing which is proper” to them (21). Later in the piece Newton also claims: “whatever has more reality in one space than in another space belongs to body rather to space” (27). Perhaps, only “God” has full (“absolute”) reality and space has less of it; as Newton writes, space has “some substantial reality” (33), but note complete such reality. This is a doctrine familiar from Descartes, who employs an "emanative cast" in the third Meditation; different degrees of reality are crucial in the fourth and fifth Meditations (M. Grene (1999) Descartes, 102). So it is no surprise that Slowik has recently reaffirmed a Platonizing reading of the passage. If we replace More’s particular conception of emanation with a more traditional version of emanation the fit with these four passages is quite close.

3) Necessary consequence
A third conception, diametrically opposed to Platonizing readings has been defended by Howard Stein. No one has done more to rehabilitate the reputation of Newton’s analysis of space among philosophical community of space-time theorists and in its wake historians of philosophy than Stein (Stein, 1970). Part of his argument turns on a revisionary analysis of emanation in Newton (see Stein 1997 and 2002). By relying on passages A and C, in particular, and on linguistic contextual evidence drawn from OED, Stein argues against a non-causal reading of emanation. Instead Stein reads Newton as employing “emanation” meaning in the sense of a “necessary consequence” (2002, 269). Now, above I have relied on aspects of Stein’s argument. Moreover, elsewhere, I have agreed with Stein’s focus on the empirical basis of Newton’s doctrines, including those pertaining to God, and Stein’s emphasis on Newton’s probabilism even fallabilism; Stein clinches his case that Newton’s doctrines do not crucially rely on Newton’s theology. Stein’s arguments have recently been affirmed by Andrew Janiak in a close study of passages A-D. 
Nevertheless, Stein and Janiak are silent on some crucial details of passages A-D. In particular, they seem to miss the fact that passage B purports to explain how qualities of space are caused by the emanative cause. We could put the argument against Stein as follows: he ignores the fact that even if we posit any being, we need not posit space as “eternal in duration and immutable in nature.” So, Stein’s argument seems to attribute to Newton conceptual question-begging. I cannot see how Stein’s resolutely anti-causal approach can account for these crucial details in passage B. This is not to say that Stein’s focus on emanation as necessary consequence is entirely misguided. In section I, I agreed with his claim that Newton is committed to the view that all beings presuppose space as a condition of possibility. It’s Stein focus on the logical structure of Newton’s position that exhibits this fact most clearly. Thus, we should not ignore the possibility that emanative causation may in many respects be more akin to a conceptual necessary consequence than efficient causation, but this cannot be the whole story. We can illustrate and make more precise what I mean by this if we focus on an unlikely source: Bacon.

4) Formal causation 
Finally, I wish to call attention to a possible source hitherto ignored in this discussion: Bacon. There was a time, from the middle of the eighteenth century onward, that Bacon and Newton were viewed as the twin sources advocating a shared, proper method of philosophizing (especially since the writings of Thomas Reid). In particular, Bacon’s and Newton’s empiricism in the service of the discovery true causes of nature, especially if accompanied with a experimentum crucis were highlighted. In recent years, commentators have been more eager to differentiate between Bacon’s natural history and Newton’s mathematical-experimental approaches (see, for example, Feingold 2000). While I endorse the recent trend, we should not be blind to Bacon’s importance and influence even on Newton. Somewhat surprisingly, Bacon does not merely use “emanation” in what we may label an innocent sense, as when he writes that the rays of light “emanate” from the sun (New Organon, 2.XII). Consider the following two paragraphs from bacon:
“On a given body, to generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures is the work and aim of human power. Of a given nature to discover the form, or true specific difference, or nature-engendering nature, or source of emanation (for these are the terms which come nearest to a description of the thing), is the work and aim of human knowledge. Subordinate to these primary works are two others that are secondary and of inferior mark: to the former, the transformation of concrete bodies, so far as this is possible; to the latter, the discovery, in every case of generation and motion, of the latent process carried on from the manifest efficient and the manifest material to the form which is engendered; and in like manner the discovery of the latent configuration of bodies at rest and not in motion.
In what an ill condition human knowledge is at the present time is apparent even from the commonly received maxims. It is a correct position that "true knowledge is knowledge by causes." And causes again are not improperly distributed into four kinds: the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final. But of these the final cause rather corrupts than advances the sciences, except such as have to do with human action. The discovery of the formal is despaired of. The efficient and the material (as they are investigated and received, that is, as remote causes, without reference to the latent process leading to the form) are but slight and superficial, and contribute little, if anything, to true and active science. Nor have I forgotten that in a former passage I noted and corrected as an error of the human mind the opinion that forms give existence. For though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy this very law, and the investigation, discovery, and explanation of it, is the foundation as well of knowledge as of operation. And it is this law with its clauses that I mean when I speak of forms, a name which I the rather adopt because it has grown into use and become familiar” (New Organon, 2.I-II; emphasis in original).

Bacon is no Scholastic, as can be clearly seen by his claims that a) “final cause rather corrupts than advances the sciences, except such as have to do with human action,” and b) “that forms give existence” is “an error.” Yet, Bacon embraces the three other Aristotelian causes (material, formal, and efficient) as entirely appropriate to his proposed science of nature. In particular, here I want to focus on Bacon’s willingness to embrace a reformulated version of formal causation; “the aim of human knowledge” is to discover the “nature-engendering nature’ of bodies in order to create new “natures.” Bacon’s forms are materialistic. In labeling his causes in this fashion, Bacon is even willing to risk confusion with the Scholastics.

Now, two aspects are relevant for my treatment of DeGrav. First Bacon glosses a “nature-engendering nature” as “a source of emanation.” Second the cause or source of emanation is associated with the form. Now the way I understand Bacon here, he is reporting the traditional meaning of words in the first paragraph, and he starts offering innovative uses in the second. If this is so, then those commentators that have tried to treat emanative causation as a species of efficient causation (McGuire, 1978; Slowik 2008, who also cites Carriero 1990) are mistaken. We need not saddle the Platonizing reading with this mistake; one may question the modern identification of More’s claim about God as “the adequate and immediate Cause” of space with an efficient cause.  Why not treat More as explicating a formal cause? 

In this paper I can allow that Bacon is innovating linguistically in both paragraphs; here the main point is that we have evidence for a subtly different reading of Newton. While I do not claim that Bacon is the source of Newton’s doctrines about space, it is worth noting that for Bacon, too, space is infinite (2.XXVI). Moreover, according to Bacon “forms…are (in the eye of reason at least, and in their essential law) eternal and immutable,” (2.IX). So, if Newton’s “first existing being” were in Bacon’s sense the formal cause of space it would have to be eternal and immutable. So, Newton’s first existing being could fit the characteristics of a Baconian form. 

Now, while Bacon is clearly an admirer of Galileo’s discoveries and willing to speculate about interplanetary travel on the basis of them (2.XXIX), his views on space and motion are too undeveloped for them to count as a source of the details of Newtonian doctrine on space. Here, I insist only that Bacon offers helpful clues for understanding Newton’s use of “emanation.”

Thus, the crucial point is that we should consider treating Newton’s “emanative” causation along the lines of nature-engendering nature, that is, as a species of formal causation in Bacon’s sense. Interestingly, formal causation shows up twice explicitly in “DeGrav:” first “that product of the divine will is the form or formal reason of the body denoting every dimension of space in which the body is to be produced” (29); second we should “distinguish between the formal reason of bodies and the act of the divine will” (31; allow me for the sake of argument that for Newton a “reason” is a “cause”). Now the context is Newton’s thought experiment about how God could have created bodies (see, especially, Newton’s claim that he is “more uncertain” and “reluctant” to claim “certainty” for it (27)). So, despite the fact that it appears that the thrust of Newton’s example is to emphasize a voluntarist conception of God, who could have created bodies differently (see also the late query 31 in Opticks), Newton is warning his readers not to confuse God’s will for the formal reason of bodies. That is to say, the “nature-engendering nature” of bodies is not God’s will, but (presumably) the essential qualities of body, e.g, i) mobility; ii) impenetrability, which Newton articulates in terms of law-like behavior in collision; and iii) that they can “excite various perceptions of the senses and the imagination in created minds, and conversely be moved by them,” (DeGrav, 28-9). This list helps us appreciate that Newton’s formal reason(s) should not be conflated with an efficient cause.  

One might object that given that Newton did not shy away from the language of formal causation/reason, why would he not use that language in describing the relationship between the first existing (eternal, immutable, etc) thing and space? The response to this is straightforward: if Newton is following Bacon’s usage then emanation picks out a particular species of formal causation. 

What else can be said in favor of this option? First, if we treat the emanative cause as a species of formal cause then we can make sense of Stein’s qualms about treating it as a species of efficient causation; we can capture Stein’s insight that there is a necessary inference between the first existing being and the qualities of space. That is to say, it is not merely that space is a necessary consequence of any entity, but various particular qualities (immutability, eternal duration, and perhaps also infinitude and indivisibility) of space are also necessary in this way. One might capture this with the claim these are essential qualities of space for Newton. Spaces would not be space without them. Second, we can accommodate the evidence in favor of the neo-Platonizing reading of passages A-D;  we can allow that “emanation” signals Newton’s commitment to a version of the doctrine of different degrees of reality as well as the claim (in passage B) that the first existing being ‘transfers’ (somehow) its qualities to space. We can do this if we reject the claim that emanation is a species of efficient causation.

So, Bacon shows us the way to reconciling the second and third options.​[5]​ Fair enough. Now I extend my reading, by offering a speculation inspired by Thomas Kuhn, who once argued that during the scientific revolution formal causes morphed into laws of nature (T. Kuhn, 1977, Essential Tension, 21-30). His argument, while ingenuous, is largely speculative. But here we have evidence that one of Bacon’s innovations appears to reinterpret the formal cause, or nature-engendering nature, in terms of a law of nature (recall 2.II). 

My proposal is that we should treat DeGrav as offering evidence of Newton’s willingness to try out a radical new idea: the emanative cause of space is “as it were God” because it is infinite, eternal, immutable (etc; see Newton, 2004, 33), and it also has more reality. Above I noted that besides possibly signaling a philosophic conception of God, Newton could be thinking of space itself could be the emanative source of its own existence. But while radical, I neglected the possibility that the emanative source of space could be better conceived as a formal cause of a decidedly modern fashion: a law of nature. To be clear: I have very little positive evidence for the view that I am defending.  I am certainly not claiming that while writing DeGrav Newton conceived of the emanative cause as a law of nature. But reflection on the thrust of DeGrav could have pushed him to recognizing this. Let me offer some arguments, some new, some reiterating earlier points. 

First, laws of nature can play the logical role that Stein assigns to the emanative cause. They provide the necessity that is required for his arguments to be persuasive. Second when we conceive of emanative causation as a species of formal causation then laws of nature fit the function that “as it were God” has in the discussion of space in DeGrav; Baconian laws of nature are eternal and immutable (etc). 

Third, the laws of motion in Newton’s Principia have been treated as constitutive principles (Friedman) or deeply entrenched empirical working assumptions (Smith), but we can also read them as formal causes in Bacon’s sense. They are the natures that help define the nature of motion (see McGuire 2006 for an argument that shows the importance for Newton of identifying natures).

Fourth the Baconian aspect of Newton’s conception of a law of nature shows up in a decidedly surprising place. In one of the most voluntarist passages in Newton’s oeuvre, he writes: “it may be also allowed that God is able to create particles of matter of several sizes and figures, and in several proportions to space, and perhaps of different densities and forces, and thereby to vary the laws of nature, and made worlds of several sorts in several parts of the universe” (Query 31, Opticks 403-4; emphasis added). It is the relationships among the densities and forces of matter to space that accounts for the varying laws and worlds. That is to say, for Newton the nature-engendering nature of our world just is the way in which bodies are organized. This picks out a Baconian form. In Newton’s conception the laws of nature vary if the way bodies are organized varies. With different laws of nature or Baconian emanative causes we have different worlds. 

Of course, one might object that Newtonian laws of nature and Baconian emanative causes operate at different levels. Maarten Van Dyck has argued that “changing the mass (and thus the nature-engendering nature) [that is, Baconian emanative cause] changes the [empirical] laws of nature [e.g., law of universal gravitation]” (private correspondence with Author, 11/16/08). Even if we allow a conflation of mass (a measure) with matter, Van Dyck’s objection is less serious than it appears. The whole point of Query 31 is to deny that the laws of nature have a separate causal standing apart from the way matter is organized.​[6]​ This is the Baconian form. 

There is another objection to this Baconian reading: I have treated the emanative cause of causation as a kind of philosophic, un-anthropomorphic God. But it looks as if DeGrav has a very anthropomorphic conception of God; Newton repeatedly appeals to the “divine will;” “the power of God;” God’s “action of thinking and willing;” (27) “divine constitution” (30); “the work of God” and “creation” (33). In the Principia this kind of anthropomorphism is more strictly confined to the General Scholium added to the second edition; in Opticks it shows up in Queries 28 and 31, especially. Yet it appears to be a central conception of DeGrav. If correct, it is hard to accept a reading of Newton that treats emanation as a Baconian form or nature-engendering nature.

Yet, matters are not so simple. To see this we must investigate a little-noticed peculiarity of the structure of DeGrav. Newton’s DeGrav has two explicit appeals to the utility of his arguments in DeGrav: on is methodological in character the other theological. It turns out that that Newton’s presentation of God shifts between the two. First at the start of DeGrav Newton introduces his “twofold method” (12); it combines mathematical demonstration that abstracts from physical consideration with experimental confirmation. The two-fold method is said to be mirrored in Newton’s text: the mathematical demonstration is supposed to be confined to lemmas, propositions, and corollaries, while the “freer method of discussion” associated with the experimental confirmations are “disposed in scholia” (12). Newton explicitly justifies his introduction of experimental confirmations to make clear the “usefulness” of his mathematical demonstrations (12). 

Second, later in DeGrav, Newton sums up his treatment of the idea of body by calling attention to its “usefulness” because “it clearly involves the principal truths of metaphysics and thoroughly confirms and explains then” (31). In the very next sentence Newton makes explicit the advantages: “we cannot posit bodies of this kind without at the same time positing that God exists, and has created bodies in empty space out of nothing, and that they are beings distinct from created minds, but able to be united with minds” (31). Newton’s target is Descartes and the atheists (32). 

Now there is no conflict between the methodological and theological utility. Nor do I mean to suggest that DeGrav is organized around a distinction between a methodological and theological section. In fact, most of what we have of DeGrav is explicitly a digression (36) meant to dispose of Cartesians’ “fictions” (14; in Janiak’s edition the digression is most of the document). But the first half of the digression -- on the flaws of Cartesian conception of motion (14-21) and Newton’s positive conception of space (21-27) – is not theologically useful in the way the more speculative treatment of body (27-35) is. 

Newton’s employment of “emanative” causation (as indicated in the four passages, A-D above), which offers us an un-anthropomorphic God, is confined to the treatment of space, that is, in the part that is designed to “lay truer foundations of the mechanical sciences” (21). Presumably these foundations are the way in which his methodology is useful (cf. the use of “foundations” in 12 and 21). But when Newton turns to his theologically useful treatment of body, emanative causation is absent (except, perhaps, hypothetically at 31). The treatment of body, which is useful to metaphysics, relies on an anthropomorphic God. So, my response to the objection is not to conflate the first half of DeGrav’s digression (21-27) with the second half (27-35). It is only the first half of the digression that fits more clearly the general methodological aims of DeGrav; there emanative causation figures in the way that resemble Bacon’s notion of a formal cause.  

To sum up, if we treat emanation as a species of formal causation then we can reconcile Stein’s necessitarian reading with most of the Platonist elements that others have discerned in DeGrav, especially Newton’s commitment to doctrines of different degrees of reality as well as the manner the first existing being ‘transfers’ its qualities to space. We can also appreciate that one of Newton’s most important decisions in recasting the material for Principia was, first, to drop the language of formal causation that was still present in DeGrav and replace it with the language of law--ironically, this was a concession to Cartesian terminology; second to separate the theologically useful material from the main argument. 

While it is clear that I advocate the fourth option, my main aim has been to suggest the shortcomings of all the current readings. In particular, no reading I am familiar with has attempted to do full justice to the intricacy of all the details Newton’s treatment of emanation. My appeal to Bacon is meant to advance the argument by showing the fruitfulness of treating Newton’s use of “emanation” as a species of formal causation. But I do not claim that I have accounted for all the peculiarities of Newton’s position. I turn to one of these in next section of this paper.

III. Newton on existence and Measurement
Recall passage C: “Space is an affection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can exists which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited.” 
It continues with C*: “And the same may be asserted of duration: for certainly both are affections or attributes of a being according to which the quantity of any thing’s existence is individuated to the degree that the size of its presence and persistence is specified. So that the quantity of the existence of God is eternal in relation to duration, and infinite in relation to the space in which he is present; and the quantity of the existence of a created thing is as great in relation to duration as the duration since the beginning of its existence, and in relation to the size of its presence, it is as great as the space in which it is present” (25-6).
It is to Ed Slowik’s credit that he has tried to fit C* in his Platonizing interpretation of DeGrav. I am unfamiliar with no other such attempt. Nevertheless, even he has to admit that the, ““quantity of existence” is a fairly mysterious and undefined notion in the De Gravitatione, so it is difficult to draw a specific conclusion based on this use of terminology.” I agree with Slowik. But this does not mean we cannot say anything at all. 

First Newton indicates that he is treating space and time symmetrically something which carries over in Principia (Gorham 2008). This means that time is also a condition of possibility of all existing entities. Time is presumably also indivisible, infinite, etc. Whatever we say about the emanative relation between “as it were God” and space also holds between God and time. 

Second, Newton’s two-fold method is not exhausted by mathematical propositions and experimental confirmations; measurement is the method to establish the way of being of entities. Recall that Newton allows that entities can have different degrees of reality and their own manner of existing. Yet, when in the mechanical sciences we individuate entities they exist in some space-time structure. They can then have “substantial reality” without “inhering in a subject” (32-3; see also Stein 2002). Newton insists against Descartes that bodies must also have “the capacities” to “stimulate perceptions in the mind by means of various bodies” (35). For a body to be a body in the mechanical sciences it must be susceptible to measurement. (The criticism of Descartes’ treatment of motion boils down to the claim that Descartes’ concepts cannot yield a “determinate motion” 20!) What is true of body is true of all entities: they must have the ability to be perceived by minds by means of other bodies, that is, rods (to measure distance) and timekeepers (to measure duration). We can now appreciate the relevance of C*.

In C*, Newton is concerned with individuation. Given Newton’s heavy emphasis on quantities and sizes in C*, we should understand Newton as focusing on how measurement individuates. Newton is not claiming that measurement reveals all aspects of an entity. But if we individuate an entity by measuring it then it exists as a magnitude in space and as a magnitude in time.  This is why in DeGrav Newton’s conception of existence really helps to “lay truer foundations of the mechanical sciences” (21). 

If we read DeGrav carefully we see it has a very radical message: if God is going to be susceptible to analysis within natural philosophy (see the General Scholium or Query 31 in Opticks), then it, too, must be susceptible to measurement. No wonder Newton suppressed its publication.










^1	  The author thanks Maarten Van Dyck for very helpful comments. The usual caveats apply.
^2	  See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy; http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/emanatio.htm, accessed on October 24, 2008. 
^3	  Slowik (2008) quotes the relevant passage from More’s The Immortality of the Soul  (1997, 33) as follows: ““an Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very Substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof”, and explains that this “Cause” is “the adequate and immediate Cause”, and that the “Effect” exists “so long as that Substance does exist.””
^4	  For more on Hume’s Rules of Reasoning and their relationships to Newton, see section 4.5 in Schliesser, Eric, "Hume's Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/hume-newton/>.
^5	  Slowik’s very fine paper does one disservice to the dialectic surrounding the meaning of Newtonian “emanation.” Stein's treatment of Newton's use of “emanation” is not itself an argument for a ‘third way’ between the debate over substantivalist and relationist interpretation of “absolute” space, although it can certainly be slotted into such a one (as it is in Slowik's reconstruction of Stein’s argument). Stein's treatment of emanation is really designed to put claims about the importance of Newton's theology on the defensive.
^6	  In my “Without God: Gravity as a Relational Quality of Matter in Newton’s Treatise” http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004248/, I argue that this is the view that guided Newton’s treatment of gravity in the first edition of Principia. 
